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Abstract
Replicated services accessed via quorums enable each access to be performed at only a
subset (quorum) of the servers, and achieve consistency across accesses by requiring any two
quorums to intersect. Recently, b-masking quorum systems, whose intersections contain at
least 2b+1 servers, have been proposed to construct replicated services tolerant of b arbitrary
(Byzantine) server failures. In this paper we consider a hybrid fault model allowing benign
failures in addition to the Byzantine ones. We present four novel constructions for b-masking
quorum systems in this model, each of which has optimal load (the probability of access of
the busiest server) or optimal availability (probability of some quorum surviving failures).
To show optimality we also prove lower bounds on the load and availability of any b-masking
quorum system in this model.
1 Introduction
Quorum systems are well known tools for increasing the efficiency of replicated services, as well as
their availability when servers may fail benignly. A quorum system is a set of subsets (quorums)
of servers, every pair of which intersect. Quorum systems enable each client operation to be
performed only at a quorum of the servers, while the intersection property makes it possible to
preserve consistency among operations at the service.
Quorum systems work well for environments where servers may fail benignly. However, when
servers may suffer arbitrary (Byzantine) failures, the intersection property does not suffice for
maintaining consistency; two quorums may intersect in a subset containing faulty servers only,
who may deviate arbitrarily and undetectably from their assigned protocol. Malkhi and Reiter
thus introduced masking quorums systems [MR98a], in which each pair of quorums intersects in
sufficiently many servers to mask out the behavior of faulty servers. More precisely, a b-masking
∗Preprint of paper to appear in SIAM Journal of Computing.
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quorum system is one in which any two quorums intersect in 2b + 1 servers, which suffices to
ensure consistency in the system if at most b servers suffer Byzantine failures.
In this paper we develop four new constructions for b-masking quorum systems. For the
first time in this context, we distinguish between masking Byzantine faults and surviving a
possibly larger number of benign faults. Our systems remain available in the face of any f
crashes, where f may be significantly larger than b (such a system is called f -resilient). In
addition, our constructions demonstrate optimality (ignoring constants) in two widely accepted
measures of quorum systems, namely load and crash probability. The load (L), a measure of
best-case performance of the quorum system, is the probability with which the busiest server
is accessed under the best possible strategy for accessing quorums. The crash probability (Fp)
is the probability, assuming that each server crashes with independent probability p, that all
quorums in the system will contain at least one crashed server (and thus will be unavailable).
The crash probability is an even more refined measure of availability than f , as a good system
will tolerate many failure configurations with more than f crashes. Three of our systems are
the first systems to demonstrate optimal load for b-masking quorum systems, and two of our
systems each demonstrate optimal crash probability for its resilience f . In proving optimality
of our constructions, we prove new lower bounds for the load and crash probability of masking
quorum systems.
The techniques for achieving our constructions are of interest in themselves. Two of the
constructions are achieved using a boosting technique, which can transform any regular (i.e.,
benign fault-tolerant) quorum system into a masking quorum system of an appropriately larger
system. Thus, it makes all known quorum constructions available for Byzantine environments
(of appropriate sizes). In the analysis of one of our best systems we employ strong results from
percolation theory.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We review related work and preliminary
definitions in Sections 2 and 3, respectively. In Section 4 we prove bounds on the load and crash
probability for b-masking quorum systems and introduce quorum composition. In Sections 5–7
we describe our new constructions. We discuss our results in Section 8.
2 Related work
Our work borrows from extensive prior work in benignly fault-tolerant quorum systems (e.g., [Gif79,
Tho79, Mae85, GB85, Her86, BG87, ET89, AE91, CAA92, NW98, PW97b]). The notion of
availability we use here (crash probability) is well known in reliability theory [BP75] and has
been applied extensively in the analysis of quorum systems (cf. [BG87, PW95, PW97a] and the
references therein). The load of a quorum system was first defined and analyzed in [NW98],
which proved a lower bound of Ω( 1√
n
) on the load of any quorum system (and, a fortiori, any
masking quorum system) over n servers. In proving load-optimality of our constructions, we
generalize this lower bound to Ω(
√
b
n) for b-masking quorum systems.
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b Maximum number of Byzantine server failures.
c(Q) Size of the smallest quorum in Q.
f Resilience (Definition 3.4).
Fp(Q) Crash probability (Definition 3.10).
IS(Q) Size of smallest intersection between any two quorums in Q.
L(Q) Load of Q (Definition 3.8).
MT (Q) Size of a smallest transversal of Q (Definition 3.3).
n Number of servers (i.e., |U | = n).
p Independent probability that each server crashes.
Q A quorum system (Definition 3.1).
U Universe of servers.
Table 1: The notation used in this paper.
Grids, which form the basis for our M-Grid construction, were proposed in [Mae85, CAA92,
KRS93, MR98a]. The technique of quorum composition, which we use in our RT and boostFPP
constructions, has been studied in [MP92, NM92, Nei92] under various names such as “coterie
join” and “recursive majority”. Our M-Path construction generalizes the system of [WB92],
coupled with the analysis of the Paths construction of [NW98], and the recent system of [Baz96].
Several constructions of masking quorum systems were given in [MR98a] for a variety of
failure models. For the model we consider here—i.e., any b servers may experience Byzantine
failures—that work gave two constructions. We compare those constructions to ours in Section 8.
Hybrid failure models have been considered in other works (e.g., [GP92, LR93, LR94, RB94]).
3 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce notation and definitions used in the remainder of the paper. Much
of the notation introduced in this section is summarized in Table 1 for quick reference.
We assume a universe U of servers, |U | = n, over which our quorum systems will be con-
structed. Servers that obey their specifications are correct. A faulty server, however, may deviate
from its specification arbitrarily. We assume that up to b servers may fail arbitrarily and that
4b < n, since this is necessary for a b-masking quorum system to exist [MR98a]. Beginning in
Section 3.2.2, we will also distinguish benign (crash) failures as a particular failure of interest,
and in general there may be more than b such failures.
3.1 Quorum systems
Definition 3.1 A quorum system Q ⊆ 2U is a collection of subsets of U , each pair of which
intersect. Each Q ∈ Q is called a quorum.
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We use the following notation. The cardinality of the smallest quorum in Q is denoted by
c(Q) = min{|Q| : Q ∈ Q}. The size of the smallest intersection between any two quorums is
denoted by IS(Q) = min{|Q ∩ R| : Q,R ∈ Q}. The degree of an element i ∈ U in a quorum
system Q is the number of quorums that contain i: deg(i) = |{Q ∈ Q : i ∈ Q}|.
Definition 3.2 A quorum system Q is (s, d)-fair if |Q| = s for all Q ∈ Q and deg(i) = d for
all i ∈ U . Q is called fair if it is (s, d)-fair for some s and d.
Definition 3.3 A set T is a transversal of a quorum system Q if T ∩Q 6= ∅ for every Q ∈ Q.
The cardinality of the smallest transversal is denoted byMT (Q) = min{|T | : T is a transversal of Q}.
Regular quorum systems, with IS(Q) = 1, are insufficient to guarantee consistency in case
of Byzantine failures. Malkhi and Reiter [MR98a] defined several varieties of quorum systems
for Byzantine environments, which are suitable for different types of services. In this paper we
focus on masking quorum systems.
Definition 3.4 [MR98a] The resilience f of a quorum system Q is the largest k such that for
every set K ⊆ U , |K| = k, there exists Q ∈ Q such that K ∩Q = ∅.
Remark: The resilience of any quorum system Q is f =MT (Q)− 1.
Definition 3.5 [MR98a] A quorum system Q is a b-masking quorum system if it is resilient to
f ≥ b failures, and obeys the following consistency requirement:
∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q : |Q1 ∩Q2| ≥ 2b+ 1. (1)
Remark: Informally, if we view the service as a shared variable which is updated and read by
the clients, then the resilience requirement of Definition 3.4 ensures that no set of b ≤ f faulty
servers will be able to block update operations (e.g., by causing every update transaction to
abort). The consistency requirement of Definition 3.5 ensures that read operations can mask
out any faulty behavior of up to b servers. Examples of protocols implementing various data
abstractions using b-masking quorum systems can be found in [MR98a, MR98b, MR98c].
Lemma 3.6 Let Q be a quorum system. Then Q is b-masking if both the following conditions
hold:
1. MT (Q) ≥ b+ 1,
2. IS(Q) ≥ 2b+ 1.
Proof: Assume that MT (Q) ≥ b + 1. To see that Q is resilient to b failures, note that if there
exists some K such that K ∩Q 6= ∅ for all Q ∈ Q, then K is a transversal. By the minimality
we have |K| ≥ b+ 1, and we are done. Condition 2 immediately implies (1). ✷
Corollary 3.7 Let Q be a quorum system, and let b = min{MT (Q)− 1,IS(Q)−12 }. Then Q is
b-masking. ✷
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3.2 Measures
The goal of using quorum systems is to increase the availability of replicated services and decrease
their access costs. A natural question is how well any particular quorum system achieves these
goals, and moreover, how well it compares with other quorum systems. Several measures will
be of interest to us.
3.2.1 Load
A measure of the inherent performance of a quorum system is its load. Naor and Wool define the
load of a quorum system as the frequency of accessing the busiest server using the best possible
strategy [NW98]. More precisely, given a quorum system Q, an access strategy w is a probability
distribution on the elements of Q; i.e., ∑Q∈Qw(Q) = 1. The value w(Q) ≥ 0 is the frequency
of choosing quorum Q when the service is accessed. The load is then defined as follows:
Definition 3.8 Let a strategy w be given for a quorum system Q = {Q1, . . . , Qm} over a uni-
verse U . For an element u ∈ U , the load induced by w on u is lw(u) =
∑
Qi∋uw(Qi). The load
induced by a strategy w on a quorum system Q is Lw(Q) = maxu∈U{lw(u)}. The system load on
a quorum system Q is L(Q) = minw{Lw(Q)}, where the minimum is taken over all strategies.
We reiterate that the load is a best case definition. The load of the quorum system will be
achieved only if an optimal access strategy is used, and only in the case that no failures occur.
A strength of this definition is that the load is a property of a quorum system, and not of the
protocol using it. Examples of load calculations can be found in [Woo96]. As an aside, we note
that not every quorum system can have a strategy that induces the same load on each server.
In [HMP97] it is shown that for some quorum systems it is impossible to perfectly balance the
load.
Recall that c(Q) denotes the cardinality of the smallest quorum in Q. The following result
will be useful to us in the sequel (recall Definition 3.2).
Proposition 3.9 [NW98] Let Q be a fair quorum system. Then L(Q) = c(Q)/n.
3.2.2 Availability
By definition a b-masking quorum system can mask up to b arbitrary (Byzantine) failures.
However, such a system may be resilient to more benign failures. By benign failures we mean
any failures that render a server unresponsive, which we refer to as crashes to distinguish them
from Byzantine failures.
The resilience f of a quorum system provides one measure of how many crash failures a
quorum system is guaranteed to survive, and indeed this measure has been used in the past to
differentiate among quorum systems [BG86]. However, it is possible that an f -resilient quorum
system, though vulnerable to a few failure configurations of f + 1 failures, can survive many
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configurations of more than f failures. One way to measure this property of a quorum system
is to assume that each server crashes independently with probability p and then to determine
the probability Fp that some quorum survives with no faulty members. This is known as crash
probability and is formally defined as follows:
Definition 3.10 Assume that each server in the system crashes independently with probability
p. For every quorum Q ∈ Q let EQ be the event that Q is hit, i.e., at least one element
i ∈ Q has crashed. Let crash(Q) be the event that all the quorums Q ∈ Q were hit, i.e.,
crash(Q) = ∧Q∈Q EQ. Then the system crash probability is Fp(Q) = P(crash(Q)).
We would like Fp to be as small as possible. A desirable asymptotic behavior of Fp is that
Fp → 0 when n →∞ for all p < 1/2, and such an Fp is called Condorcet (after the Condorcet
Jury Theorem [Con]).
4 Building blocks
In this section, we prove several theorems which will be our basic tools in the sequel. First we
prove lower bounds on the load and availability of b-masking quorum systems, against which
we measure all our new constructions. Then we prove the properties of a quorum composition
technique, which we later use extensively.
4.1 The load and availability of masking quorum systems
We begin by establishing a lower bound on the load of b-masking quorum systems, thus tightening
the lower bound on general quorum systems [NW98] as presented in [MR98a].
Theorem 4.1 Let Q be a b-masking quorum system. Then L(Q) ≥ max{2b+1c(Q) , c(Q)n }.
Proof: Let w be any strategy for the quorum system Q, and fix Q1 ∈ Q such that |Q1| = c(Q).
Summing the loads induced by w on all the elements of Q1, and using the fact that any two
quorums have at least 2b+ 1 elements in common, we obtain:∑
u∈Q1
lw(u) =
∑
u∈Q1
∑
Qi∋u
w(Qi) =
∑
Qi
∑
u∈(Q1∩Qi)
w(Qi)
≥
∑
Qi
(2b+ 1)w(Qi) = 2b+ 1.
Therefore, there exists some element in Q1 that suffers a load of at least
2b+1
|Q1| .
Similarly, summing the total load induced by w on all of the elements of the universe, and
using the minimality of c(Q), we get:
∑
u∈U
lw(u) =
∑
u∈U
∑
Qi∋u
w(Qi) =
∑
Qi
|Qi|w(Qi)
6
≥
∑
Qi
c(Q)w(Qi) = c(Q).
Therefore, there exists some element in U that suffers a load of at least c(Q)n . ✷
Corollary 4.2 Let Q be a b-masking quorum system. Then L(Q) ≥
√
2b+1
n , and equality holds
if c(Q) =
√
(2b+ 1)n.1 ✷
Remark: Corollary 4.2 shows that the threshold construction of [MR98a] in fact has optimal
load when b = Ω(n). E.g., when b ≈ n/4 the obtained load is ≈ 0.75, but for such systems
we can only hope for a constant load of ≈ 1/√2 = 0.707. However the load of the threshold
construction is always ≥ 1/2, which is far from optimal for smaller values of b.
On the other hand, the grid-based construction of [MR98a] does not have optimal load. It
has quorums of size O(b
√
n) and load of roughly 2b/
√
n. In the sequel we show systems which
significantly improve this: some of our new constructions have quorums of size O(
√
bn) and
optimal load.
Our next propositions show lower bounds on the crash probability Fp in terms of MT (Q)
and b.
Proposition 4.3 Let Q be a quorum system. Then Fp(Q) ≥ pMT (Q) = pf+1 for any p ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: Consider a minimal transversal T with |T | =MT (Q). If all the elements of T crash then
every quorum contains a crashed element, so Fp(Q) ≥ pMT (Q). ✷
Proposition 4.4 Let Q be a b-masking quorum system. Then Fp(Q) ≥ pc(Q)−2b for any p ∈
[0, 1].
Proof: Let Q ∈ Q be a minimal quorum with |Q| = c(Q), and consider Z ⊂ Q, |Z| = 2b. Since
Q is b-masking then |R ∩Q| ≥ 2b + 1 for any R ∈ Q, and so |(Q \ Z) ∩ R| ≥ 1 and Q \ Z is a
transversal. Therefore MT (Q) ≤ c(Q)− 2b, which we plug into Proposition 4.3. ✷
The next proposition is less general than Proposition 4.4, however it is applicable for most of
our constructions and it gives a much tighter bound.
Proposition 4.5 Let Q be a b-masking quorum system such that MT (Q) ≤ (IS(Q) + 1)/2.
Then Fp(Q) ≥ pb+1 for any p ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: IfMT (Q) ≤ (IS(Q)+1)/2 then from Corollary 3.7 we have that b+1 =MT (Q), which
again we plug into Proposition 4.3. ✷
1To avoid repetitive notation, we omit floor and ceiling brackets from expressions for integral quantities.
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4.2 Quorum system composition
Quorum system composition is a well known technique for building new systems out of existing
components. We compose a quorum system S over another system R by replacing each element
of S with a distinct copy of R. In other words, when element i is used in a quorum S ∈ S we
replace it with a complete quorum from the i’th copy of R. Using the terminology of reliability
theory, the system S ◦ R has a modular decomposition where each module is a copy of R.
Formally:
Definition 4.6 Let S and R be two quorum systems, over universes of sizes nS and nR, re-
spectively. Let R1, . . . ,RnS be nS copies of R over disjoint universes. Then the composition of
S over R is
S ◦ R =
{⋃
Ri : S ∈ S, Ri ∈ Ri for all i ∈ S
}
.
The next theorem summarizes the properties of quorum composition.
Theorem 4.7 Let S and R be two quorum systems, and let Q = S ◦ R. Then
• The universe size is nQ = nSnR.
• The minimal quorum size is c(Q) = c(S)c(R).
• The minimal intersection size is IS(Q) = IS(S)IS(R).
• The minimal transversal size is MT (Q) =MT (S)MT (R).
• Denote the crash probability functions of S and R by s(p) = Fp(S) and r(p) = Fp(R).
Then Fp(Q) = s(r(p)).
• The load is L(Q) = L(S)L(R).
Proof: The behavior of the combinatorial parameters nQ, c(Q), IS(Q) and MT (Q) is obvious.
The behavior of Fp(Q) is standard in reliability theory (cf. [BP75]). As for the load, consider
the following strategy: pick a quorum S ∈ S using the optimal strategy for S. Then for each
element i ∈ S, pick a quorum Ri ∈ Ri using the optimal strategy for (the i’th copy of) R.
Clearly this strategy induces a load of L(S)L(R), and hence L(Q) ≤ L(S)L(R).
We now show the inequality in the opposite direction. Enumerate the elements of Q by
denoting the j’th element in Ri by uij, let Q(S) = {
⋃
Ri : Ri ∈ Ri for all i ∈ S} be the set of
all quorums that are based on some S ∈ S, and let wQ be an access strategy on Q. Then wQ
induces a strategy wS on S defined by
wS(S) =
∑
Q∈Q(S)
wQ(Q). (2)
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The load on an element i ∈ S (i.e., the frequency of accessing the quorum system Ri) is then
lwS (i) =
∑
S∋i,S∈S w
S(S). Similarly, wQ induces a strategy on each copy Ri defined by
wRi(R) =
( ∑
Q⊇R
wQ(Q)
)/
lwS (i). (3)
This wRi is well defined when lwS (i) > 0. It is easy to verify that wS and wRi are indeed
strategies, i.e., that the probabilities add up to 1.
Claim 4.8 Let lwQ(uij) be the load induced by w
Q on an element uij ∈ Ri, and let lwRi (uij) be
the load induced on it by wRi . Then lwQ(uij) = lwS (i) · lwRi (uij).
Proof of Claim: Using (2) and (3) we have that
lwS (i) · lwRi (uij) = lwS (i)
∑
R∋uij
wRi(R) = lwS (i)
∑
R∋uij
( ∑
Q⊇R
wQ(Q)
)/
lwS (i)
=
∑
R∋uij
∑
Q⊇R
wQ(Q) =
∑
Q∋uij
wQ(Q) = lwQ(uij). ✷
To complete the proof of Theorem 4.7, assume that wQ is an optimal strategy forQ. Consider
the copy Ri for which lwS (i) is maximal, i.e., LwS(S) = lwS (i), and let uij be the maximally-
loaded element in this Ri. Clearly lwS (i) > 0 so wRi is well defined for this i. Note that we
do not require uij to be the maximally-loaded element in all of Q. Using the claim and the
minimality of L(S) and L(R) we obtain that
L(Q) = LwQ(Q) ≥ lwQ(uij) = lwS (i) · lwRi (uij)
= LwS (S) · LwRi (R) ≥ L(S)L(R).
By combining this inequality with the upper bound we had before we conclude that L(Q) =
L(S)L(R). ✷
The multiplicative behavior of the combinatorial parameters in composing quorum systems
provides a powerful tool for “boosting” existing constructions into larger systems with possibly
improved characteristics. Below, we use quorum composition in two cases, and demonstrate that
this technique yields improved constructions over their basic building blocks, for appropriately
larger system sizes. In particular, in Section 6 we show a composition that allows us to transform
any regular quorum construction into a (larger) b-masking quorum system.
5 Simple systems
In this section we show two types of constructions, the multi-grid (denoted M-Grid) and the
recursive threshold (RT). These systems significantly improve upon the original constructions
of [MR98a], however both are still suboptimal in some parameter: M-Grid has optimal load but
9
Figure 1: The multi-grid construction, n = 7× 7, b = 3, with one quorum shaded.
can mask only up to b = O(
√
n) failures and has poor crash probability; and RT can mask up
to b = O(n) failures and has near optimal crash probability, but has suboptimal load.
In Sections 6 and 7 we present systems which are superior to the M-Grid and RT. Nonethe-
less, we feel that the simplicity of the M-Grid and RT systems, and the fact that they are suitable
for very small universe sizes, are what makes them appealing.
5.1 The multi-grid system
We begin with the M-Grid system, which achieves an optimal load among b-masking quorum
systems, where b ≤ (√n−1)/2. The idea of the construction is as follows. Arrange the elements
in a
√
n×√n grid. A quorum in a multi-grid consists of any choice of √b+ 1 rows and √b+ 1
columns, as shown in Figure 1. Formally, denote the rows and columns of the grid by Ri and
Ci, respectively, where 1 ≤ i ≤
√
n. Then, the quorum system is
M-Grid(b) =


⋃
j∈J
Cj ∪
⋃
i∈I
Ri : J, I ⊆ {1 . . .
√
n}, |J | = |I| =
√
b+ 1

 .
Proposition 5.1 The multi-grid M-Grid(b) is a b-masking quorum system for b ≤ (√n− 1)/2.
Proof: Consider two quorums R,S ∈ M-Grid(b). If they have either a row or a column in
common, then |R ∩ S| ≥ √n ≥ 2b + 1 and we are done. Otherwise the intersection of S’s
columns with R’s rows is disjoint from the intersection of R’s columns with S’s rows, so |R∩S| ≥
2
√
b+ 1
√
b+ 1 > 2b+ 1. Therefore consistency holds.
Resilience holds since f =MT (M-Grid(b))−1 = √n−√b+ 1 ≥ b. ThereforeMT (M-Grid(b)) ≥
b+ 1, and Lemma 3.6 finishes the proof. ✷
Proposition 5.2 L(M-Grid(b)) ≈ 2
√
b+1
n .
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Figure 2: An RT(4, 3) system of depth h = 2, with one quorum shaded.
Proof: Since M-Grid(b) is fair we can use Proposition 3.9 to get L(M-Grid(b)) = c(M-Grid(b))/n.
✷
Remark: The load of M-Grid(b) is within a factor of
√
2 from the optimal load which can be
achieved for b ≈ √n/2.
A disadvantage of the M-Grid system is its poor asymptotic crash probability. If crashes
occur with some constant probability p then any configuration of crashes with at least one crash
per row disables the system. Therefore, as shown by [KC91, Woo96],
Fp(M-Grid) ≥ (1− (1− p)
√
n)
√
n −→
n→∞ 1.
5.2 Recursive threshold systems
A recursive threshold system RT(k, ℓ) of depth h is built by taking a simple building block,
which is an ℓ-of-k threshold system (with k > ℓ > k/2), and recursively composing it over itself
to depth h. In the sequel, we often omit the depth parameter h when it has no effect on the
discussion. The RT systems generalize the recursive majority constructions of [MP92], the HQS
system of [Kum91] is an RT(3, 2) system, and in fact the threshold system of [MR98a] can be
viewed as a trivial RT(4b+ 1, 3b+ 1) system with depth h = 1. As an example throughout this
section we will use the RT(4, 3) system, depicted in Figure 2.
Proposition 5.3 An RT(k, ℓ) system of depth h is a fair quorum system, with n = kh elements,
quorums of size c(RT(k, ℓ)) = ℓh, intersection size of IS(RT(k, ℓ)) = (2ℓ − k)h, and minimal
transversals of size MT (RT(k, ℓ)) = (k − ℓ+ 1)h.
Proof: The basic ℓ-of-k system is symmetric (and therefore fair), with c(ℓ-of-k) = ℓ,MT (ℓ-of-k) =
k − ℓ + 1, and IS(ℓ-of-k) = 2ℓ − k. The combinatorial parameters are computed by activating
Theorem 4.7 h times, and the composition preserves the fairness. ✷
Plugging this into Corollary 3.7 we obtain
Corollary 5.4 An RT(k, ℓ) system over a universe of size n is a b-masking quorum system for
b = min{(nlogk(2ℓ−k) − 1)/2, nlogk(k−ℓ+1) − 1}. ✷
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In the 3-of-4 example we have IS(3-of-4) = MT (3-of-4) = 2 and c(3-of-4) = 3. Therefore for
the whole system (to depth log4 n) we get c(RT(4, 3)) = n
log4 3 = n0.79, with IS(RT(4, 3)) =
MT (RT(4, 3)) = √n and thus b = (√n − 1)/2. Note that the basic 3-of-4 system is not even
1-masking since intersections of size 2 are too small, however already from h = 2 (i.e., n = 16)
we obtain a masking system.
Proposition 5.5 The load L(RT(k, ℓ)) = n−(1−logk ℓ).
Proof: Since RT(k, ℓ) is fair we can use Proposition 3.9 to get L(RT(k, ℓ)) = c(RT(k, ℓ))/n. ✷
Remark: In general the load is suboptimal for this construction. For instance, in the RT(4, 3)
system we obtain L(RT(4, 3)) = n−0.21. However for b = (√n − 1)/2 we could hope for a load
of
√
(2b+ 1)/n = n−0.25.
Proposition 5.6 There exists a unique critical probability 0 < pc < 1/2 for which
lim
h→∞
Fp(RT(k, ℓ) of depth h) =
{
0, p < pc,
1, p > pc.
Proof: Let g(p) be the crash probability function of the ℓ-of-k system and let F (h) = Fp(RT(k, ℓ) of depth h)
denote the crash probability for the RT(k, ℓ) system of depth h. Then F (h) obeys the recurrence
F (h) =
{
g(F (h − 1)), h ≥ 1,
p, h = 0.
(4)
Now g(p) is a reliability function, and therefore it is “S-shaped” (see [BP75]). This implies that
there exists a unique critical probability 0 < pc < 1 for which g(pc) = pc, such that g(p) < p
when p < pc and g(p) > p when p > pc (and [PW95] shows that for quorum systems such as
RT in fact pc < 1/2). Therefore if p < pc then repeated applications of recurrence (4) would
decrease F (h) arbitrarily close to 0, and when p > pc the limit is 1. ✷
Proposition 5.7 If p < 1/
( k
ℓ−1
)
and ℓ < k then Fp(RT(k, ℓ)) < exp(−Ω(nlogk(k−ℓ+1))), which
is optimal for systems with resilience f = nlogk(k−ℓ+1).
Proof: Let g(p) and F (h) be as in the proof of Proposition 5.6. Any configuration of at least
k − ℓ+ 1 crashes disables the ℓ-of-k system, so
g(p) =
k∑
j=k−ℓ+1
(
k
j
)
pj(1− p)k−j.
By Lemma A.2 (see Appendix) we have that
g(p) ≤
(
k
ℓ− 1
)
pk−ℓ+1.
Plugging this into (4) gives that
F (h) ≤
(
k
ℓ− 1
)1+(k−ℓ+1)+···+(k−ℓ+1)h−1
p(k−ℓ+1)
h
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<[(
k
ℓ− 1
)
p
](k−ℓ+1)h
.
If p < 1/
(
k
ℓ−1
)
then the last expression decays to zero with h, so Fp(RT(k, ℓ)) < exp(−Ω(nlogk(k−ℓ+1))).
The lower bound of Proposition 4.3 shows that
Fp(RT(k, ℓ)) ≥ pnlogk(k−ℓ+1) ,
so our analysis is tight. ✷
For the RT(4, 3) system a direct calculation shows that g(p) = 6p2−8p3+3p4 and pc = 0.2324.
Therefore Proposition 5.6 guarantees that when the element crash probability is in the range
p < 0.2324 then Fp → 0 when n→∞. Furthermore, when p < 1/6 then Proposition 5.7 shows
that the decay is rapid, with Fp(RT(4, 3)) < (6p)
√
n, which is optimal.
6 Boosted finite projective planes
In this section we introduce a family of b-masking quorum systems, the boosted finite projective
planes, which we denote by boostFPP. A boostFPP system is a composition of a finite projective
plane (FPP) over a threshold system (Thresh).
The first component of a boostFPP system is a finite projective plane of order q (a good
reference on FPP’s is [Hal86]). It is known that FPP’s exist for q = pr when p is prime. Such an
FPP has nF = q
2+q+1 elements, and quorums of size c(FPP) = q+1. This is a regular quorum
system, i.e., it has intersections of size IS(FPP) = 1. The minimal transversals of an FPP are
of sizeMT (FPP) = q+1 (in fact the only transversals of this size are the quorums themselves).
The load of FPP was analyzed in [NW98] and shown to be L(FPP) = q+1nF ≈ 1/
√
nF , which is
optimal for regular quorum systems.
The second component of a boostFPP is a Thresh system, with nT = 4b + 1 elements and
a threshold of 3b + 1. This is a b-masking quorum system in itself, with IS(Thresh) = 2b + 1,
MT (Thresh) = b+ 1 and a load of L(Thresh) ≈ 3/4.
Proposition 6.1 Let boostFPP(q, b) = FPP(q) ◦Thresh(3b+ 1 of 4b+ 1). Then the composed
system has n = (4b + 1)(q2 + q + 1) elements, with quorums of size c(boostFPP(q, b)) = (3b +
1)(q + 1), intersections of size IS(boostFPP(q, b)) = 2b + 1 and minimal transversals of size
MT (boostFPP(q, b)) = (b+1)(q+1). Therefore boostFPP(q, b) is a b-masking quorum system.
Proof: We obtain the combinatorial parameters by plugging the values of the component systems
into Theorem 4.7. By Corollary 3.7 we have that the system can mask min{(b+1)(q+1)−1, b)} =
b failures. ✷
Proposition 6.2 L(boostFPP(q, b)) ≈ 34q , which is optimal for b-masking quorum systems with
n ≈ 4bq2 elements.
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Proof: boostFPP(q, b) is a fair quorum system since both its components are fair, so by Propo-
sition 3.9 we have
L(boostFPP(q, b)) = c(boostFPP(q, b))
n
=
(3b+ 1)(q + 1)
(4b+ 1)(q2 + q + 1)
≈ 3
4q
.
On the other hand, for b-masking systems with n ≈ 4bq2 elements the lower bound of Theo-
rem 4.1 gives
L(boostFPP(q, b)) ≥
√
2b
n
≈ 1√
2q
. ✷
Note that the optimality of the load holds for any choice of q and b. Therefore when the
number of servers (or elements) increases, the boostFPP(q, b) system can scale up using different
policies while maintaining load optimality. There are two extremal policies:
1. Fix q and increase b; then the system can mask more failures when new servers are added,
however the load on the servers does not decrease.
2. Fix b and increase q; then the load decreases when new servers are added, but the number
of failures that the system can mask remains unchanged.
It is important to note that systems of arbitrarily high resilience can be constructed using
the first policy since b can be chosen independently of q. In particular, we can choose b = qa
for any a > 0. Then the resulting system has n ≈ 4bq2 = 4ba+2a , and so b ≈ (n4 ) aa+2 , thus
asymptotically approaching the resilience upper bound of n4 .
Finally we analyze the crash probability of boostFPP. The following proposition shows that
boostFPP has good availability as long as p < 1/4.
Proposition 6.3 If p < 1/4 then Fp(boostFPP(q, b)) ≤ exp(−Ω(b− log q)).
Proof: We start by estimating Fp(Thresh). Let #crashed denote the number of crashed elements
in a universe of size 4b + 1. Let γ = b+14b+1 − p, thus 0 < γ < 1 when p < 1/4. Then using the
Chernoff bound we obtain
Fp(Thresh) = P(#crashed ≥ b+ 1)
= P(#crashed ≥ (p+ γ)(4b + 1))
≤ e−2(4b+1)γ2 ≈ e−b(1−4p)2/2. (5)
Next we estimate Fp(FPP). Let Q0 ∈ FPP be some quorum. Then
Fp(FPP) = 1− P(∃Q ∈ FPP : Q is alive) ≤
1− P(Q0 is alive) = 1− (1− p)q+1 ≤ (q + 1)p. (6)
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Using Theorem 4.7 we plug (5) into (6) to obtain
Fp(boostFPP(q, b)) ≤ (q + 1)e−b(1−4p)2/2 = e−Ω(b−log q). ✷
Remarks:
• In general the crash probability is not optimal; since MT (boostFPP(q, b)) ≈ bq then the
lower bound of Proposition 4.3 shows we could hope for a crash probability of exp(−Ω(bq)).
Nevertheless if q is constant then Fp is asymptotically optimal, and if b≫ q then the gap
between the upper and lower bounds is small.
• The final estimate we get for Fp(boostFPP) seems poor, as the bound is higher than
the crash probability of the Thresh components. However this is not an artifact of over-
estimates in our analysis. Rather, it is a result of the property that the crash probability
of FPP is higher than p, and in fact Fp(FPP) → 1 as shown by [RST92, Woo96]. In this
light it is not surprising that boostFPP does not have an optimal crash probability.
• The requirement p < 1/4 is essential for this system; if p > 1/4 then in fact Fp(boostFPP)
→ 1 as n→∞.
7 The multi-path system
Here we introduce the construction we call the Multi-Path system, denoted by M-Path. The
elements of this system are the vertices of a triangulated square
√
n × √n grid; formally, the
vertices are the points {(i, j) ∈ R2 : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ √n; i, j ∈ Z}. The triangulated grid has an
edge between (i1, j1) and (i2, j2) if one of the following three conditions holds: (i) i1 = i2 and
j2 = j1 + 1; (ii) j1 = j2 and i2 = i1 + 1; (iii) i2 = i1 − 1 and j2 = j1 + 1. A quorum in the
M-Path system consists of
√
2b+ 1 disjoint paths from the left side to the right side of the grid
(LR paths) and
√
2b+ 1 disjoint top-bottom (TB) paths (see Figure 3).
The M-Path system has several characteristics similar to the basic M-Grid system of Sec-
tion 5, namely an ability to mask b = O(
√
n) failures, and optimal load. Its major advantage is
that it also has an optimal crash probability Fp. Moreover, it is the only construction we have
for which Fp → 0 as n→∞ when the individual crash probability p is arbitrarily close to 1/2.
We are able to prove this behavior of Fp using results from Percolation theory [Kes82, Gri89].
Remark: The system we present here is based on a triangular lattice, with elements correspond-
ing to vertices, as in [WB92, Baz96]. We have also constructed a second system which is based
on the square lattice with elements corresponding to the edges, as in [NW98]. The properties of
this second system are almost identical to those of M-Path, so we omit it.
Proposition 7.1 M-Path(b) has minimal quorums of size c(M-Path) ≤ 2
√
n(2b+ 1), minimal
intersections of size IS(M-Path) ≥ 2b + 1, and minimal transversals of size MT (M-Path) =√
n−√2b+ 1 + 1. Therefore M-Path is a b-masking quorum system for b ≤ √n−√2n1/4.
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Figure 3: A multi-path construction on a 9× 9 grid, b = 4, with one quorum shaded.
Proof: Let Q1, Q2 ∈ M-Path(b). Then the
√
2b+ 1 LR paths of Q1 intersect the
√
2b+ 1 TB
paths of Q2 in ≥ 2b + 1 elements, since the LR and TB paths are disjoint. As in the M-Grid
system we have that MT (M-Path(b)) = √n−√2b+ 1+1, so when b ≤ √n−√2n1/4 it follows
that MT (M-Path(b)) ≥ b+ 1 and we are done. ✷
Proposition 7.2 L(M-Path(b)) ≤ 2
√
2b+1
n , which is optimal.
Proof: The strategy only uses straight line LR and TB paths. It picks
√
2b+ 1 of the
√
n rows
uniformly at random and likewise for the columns. Clearly the load equals the probability of
accessing some element in position i, j, which is
L(M-Path) ≤ P(row i chosen) + P(column j chosen)
≤ 2
( √
n− 1√
2b+ 1− 1
)
/
( √
n√
2b+ 1
)
= 2
√
2b+ 1/
√
n.
By Corollary 4.2 this is optimal. ✷
Proposition 7.3 Fp(M-Path(b)) ≤ exp(−Ω(
√
n −
√
b)) for any p < 1/2, which is optimal for
systems with resilience f = O(
√
n−
√
b).
Proof: We use the notation Pp(E) to denote the probability of event E defined on the grid when
the individual crash probability is p. A path is called “open” if all its elements are alive.
Let LR be the event “there exists an open LR path in the grid”, and let LRk be the event
“there exist k open LR paths”. A failure configuration in M-Path(b) is one in which either√
2b+ 1 open LR paths or
√
2b+ 1 open TB paths do not exist. By symmetry we have that
Fp(M-Path(b)) ≤ 2Pp(LR√2b+1) = 2(1 − Pp(LR√2b+1)). (7)
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Fix some p′ such that p < p′ < 1/2. Then by Theorem B.3 (see Appendix) we have that
1− Pp(LR√2b+1) ≤
(
1− p
p′ − p
)√2b+1−1
[1− Pp′(LR)]. (8)
Plugging the bound on Pp′(LR) from Theorem B.1 into (8) and (7) yields
Fp(M-Path(b)) ≤ 2
(
1− p
p′ − p
)√2b+1−1
e−ψ(p
′)
√
n
= 2e
−ψ(p′)√n+(√2b+1−1) ln
(
1−p
p′−p
)
for some function ψ(p′) > 0. Now
√
2b+ 1 = O(n1/4), so for large enough n we can certainly
write
Fp(M-Path(b)) ≤ exp(−Ω(
√
n−
√
b)).
This is optimal by Proposition 4.3. ✷
8 Discussion
We have presented four novel constructions of b-masking quorum systems. For the first time in
this context, we considered the resilience of such systems to crash failures in addition to their
tolerance of (possibly fewer) Byzantine failures. Each of our constructions is optimal in either
its load or its crash probability (for sufficiently small p). Moreover, one of our constructions,
namely M-Paths, is optimal in both measures. One of our constructions is achieved using a novel
boosting technique that makes all known benign fault-tolerant quorum constructions available
for Byzantine environments (of appropriate sizes). In proving optimality of our constructions,
we also contribute lower bounds on the load and crash probability of any b-masking quorum
system.
The properties of our various constructions are summarized in Table 2, alongside the prop-
erties of two other b-masking constructions proposed in [MR98a], namely Threshold and Grid.
Determining the best quorum construction depends on the goals and constraints of any
particular settings, as no system is advantageous in all measures. For example, suppose we
fix n to be 1024, the desired load L to be approximately 1/4, and assume that the individual
failure probability of components is 1/8. In these settings, an M-Grid system can tolerate b = 15
Byzantine failures and up to f = 28 benign failures, but has a failure probability Fp ≥ 0.638.
In the same settings, a boostFPP system (with n = 1001, q = 3) can tolerate b = 19, up
to f = 79 benign failures, with somewhat better failure probability: it has Fp ≤ 0.372. The
M-Path construction, with 4 LR and 4 TB paths per quorum, has b = 7 here, and can tolerate
up to f = 29 benign failures, but has a good crash probability: Fp ≤ 0.001 (using the estimate
following Theorem B.1, together with Theorem B.3 with p′ = 1/7). In this setting, the RT(4, 3)
construction, with depth h = 5, is the best, with b = 15, f = 31 and an excellent failure
probability of only Fp ≤ 0.0001.
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System b < f L Fp
Threshold [MR98a] n/4 O(n− b) 1/2 +O(b/n) exp(−Ω(f)) ∗
Grid [MR98a]
√
n/3 O(
√
n− b) O(b/√n) −→
n→∞ 1
M-Grid
√
n/2 O(
√
n−√b) O(
√
b/n) † −→
n→∞ 1
RT(k, ℓ)‡ O(min{nα1 , nα2}) ‡ O(b) n−(1−logk ℓ) exp(−Ω(f)) ∗
boostFPP n/4 O(
√
bn) O(
√
b/n) † exp(−Ω(b− log(n/b)))
M-Path (1− o(1))√n O(√n−√b) O(
√
b/n) † exp(−Ω(f)) ∗
† Optimal for b-masking systems
∗ Optimal for f -resilient systems
‡ α1 = logk(2ℓ− k) and α2 = logk(k − ℓ+ 1)
Table 2: Constructions in this paper (n = number of servers).
More generally, if masking large numbers of Byzantine server failures is important, then of
the systems listed in Table 2, only Threshold and boostFPP can provide the highest possible
masking ability, i.e., up to b < n/4. However, Threshold can mask n/4 Byzantine failures for
any system size, whereas boostFPP approaches such degree of Byzantine resilience only for very
large n. If, on the other hand, load is more crucial, then Threshold suffers in load whereas
boostFPP offers reduced load, as do the other three systems in this paper, albeit with lower
masking ability. If masking fewer Byzantine server failures is allowable, then other quorum
constructions can be used, in particular RT and M-Path. These two constructions have similar
masking ability, resilience, and load, but M-Path has asymptotically superior crash probability
when p is close to 1/2.
Finally, we note that it is impossible to achieve optimal resilience and load simultaneously:
Since necessarily f ≤ c(Q), Theorem 4.1 implies that f ≤ nL(Q), i.e., when load is low then
so is resilience, and when resilience is high then so is load. In order to break this tradeoff,
in [MRWW98] we propose relaxing the intersection property of masking quorum systems, so
that “quorums” chosen according to a specific strategy intersect each other in enough correct
servers to maintain correctness of the system with a high probability.
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Appendix
A Combinatorial Lemmas
Lemma A.1 Let 0 ≤ i, d ≤ k be integers. Then (
k
d+i)
(kd)
≤ (k−di ).
Proof:
(
k
d+i
)
(k
d
) = k!d!(k − d)!
(d+ i)!(k − d− i)!k! =
(k − d)!
(k − d− i)!
d!
(d+ i)!
≤ (k − d)!
(k − d− i)!i! =
(
k − d
i
)
✷
Lemma A.2 Let 0 ≤ d ≤ k be integers and let p ∈ [0, 1]. Then
k∑
j=d
(
k
j
)
pj(1− p)k−j ≤
(
k
d
)
pd.
Proof:
k∑
j=d
(
k
j
)
pj(1− p)k−j =
(
k
d
)
pd
k∑
j=d
(k
j
)
(k
d
)pj−d(1− p)k−j,
so it suffices to show that the last sum is ≤ 1. But using Lemma A.1 we get
k∑
j=d
(
k
j
)
(k
d
)pj−d(1− p)k−j =
k−d∑
i=0
(
k
d+i
)
(k
d
) pi(1− p)k−d−i
≤
k−d∑
i=0
(
k − d
i
)
pi(1− p)k−d−i = [p + (1− p)]k−d = 1. ✷
B Theorems of Percolation Theory
In this section we list the definitions and results that are used in our analysis of the M-Path
system, following [Kes82, Gri89].
The percolation model we are interested in is as follows. Let Z be the graph of the (infinite)
triangle lattice in the plane. Assume that a vertex is closed with probability p and open with
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probability 1 − p, independently of other vertices. This model is known as site percolation on
the triangle lattice. Another natural model, which plays a minor role in our work, is the bond
percolation model. In it the edges are closed with probability p.
A key idea in percolation theory is that there exists a critical probability, pc, such that graphs
with p < pc exhibit qualitatively different properties than graphs with p > pc. For example, Z
with p < pc has a single connected (open) component of infinite size. When p > pc there is no
such component. For site percolation on the triangle pc = 1/2 [Kes80].
The following theorem shows that when the probability p for a closed vertex is below the
critical probability, the probability of having long open paths tends to 1 exponentially fast.
Recall that LR is the event “there exists an open LR path in the
√
n×√n grid”. Then [Men86]
(see also [Gri89] p. 287) implies
Theorem B.1 If p < 1/2 then Pp(LR) ≥ 1− e−ψ(p)
√
n, for some ψ(p) > 0 independent of n.
Remark: The dependence of ψ on p is such that ψ(p)→ 0 when p→ 1/2. However, for p’s not
too close to 1/2 we can obtain concrete estimates using elementary techniques. For instance, a
counting argument similar to that of Bazzi [Baz96] shows that
Pp(LR) ≥ 1−
√
n(3p)
√
n
1− 3p ,
when p < 1/3.
Definition B.2 Let E be an event defined in the percolation model. Then the interior of E with
depth r, denoted Ir(E), is the set of all configurations in E which are still in E even if we perturb
the states of up to r vertices.
We may think of Ir(E) as the event that E occurs and is ‘stable’ with respect to changes in
the states of r or fewer vertices. The definition is useful to us in the following situation. If LR
is the event “there exists an open left-right path in a rectangle D”, then it follows that Ir(LR)
is the event “there are at least r + 1 disjoint open left-right paths in D”.
Theorem B.3 [ACC+83] Let E be an increasing event and let r be a positive integer. Then
1− Pp(Ir(E)) ≤
(
1− p
p′ − p
)r
[1− Pp′(E)]
whenever 0 ≤ p < p′ ≤ 1.
The theorem amounts to the assertion that if E is likely to occur when the crash probability
is p′, then Ir(E) is likely to occur when the crash probability p is smaller than p′.
22
